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Police v D [2000] NZFLR 237 (DC)

Case summary provided by LEXISNEXIS NZ

Name: Police v D
Reported: [2000] NZFLR 237
File number: CRN 9255025991
Date: 17 September 1999
Court: District Court
Location: Papakura
Judge: Hole DCJ
Charge: Burglary
CYPFA: s5(f); s322
Key Title: Delay

LEXISNEXIS Summary:

Youth Offenders - Delay - Assessment of time frame from receipt of information through to completion of implementation of any decision - Police had delayed in speaking to informant - Offender was then spoken to - Whether delays were too great having regard to young person’s age and his sense of time - Young person was aged 14 years - Discretion to dismiss proceedings - Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 322.

The young person, D at the centre of these proceedings was charged with burglary. The police had received information from a possible informant on 25 January 1999 and it was recommended that she be spoken to. Though her address and school was known and it was understood that she was not on the phone she was not in fact spoken to until 20 May. D was then spoken to three days later and denied the offence. The matter was referred to the Manurewa Youth Aid centre which contacted D’s parents advising that a family group conference would be set down. The information was laid on 10 August 1999, presumably after that conference had been held.

D applied to have the information dismissed either under s 322 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act or under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction on the basis of delay. D submitted that the Court must have regard to s 5(f) of the Act which required that decisions affecting the young person should be made within a timeframe appropriate to the child or young person’s sense of time.

Held (Dismissing the information)

(1) The Court was entitled to look at the chronology and consider whether any period amounted to unnecessary or unduly protracted delay. It appeared that there was such delay between 10 February 1999 and 23 May 1999. D had been contacted little was done until the middle of June. This was enough to dispose of the application in itself.

(2) The Court was also entitled to exercise its inherent jurisdiction and have regard to the principle set out in s 5(f). The Court was required to ask itself whether decisions affecting D who was 14 could be made and implemented with a timeframe appropriate to his sense of time. Any sentence imposed, even for a minimum term would take the matter through to the beginning of the year 2000. That meant a period of one year from the receipt of the information to the end of the matter. That was simply too long, even having regard to the serious nature of the offence. And the Court could dismiss the proceedings under its inherent jurisdiction as well.

Cases referred to in judgment

Police v BRR (1993) 11 FRNZ 25

Application

This was an application to dismiss an information laid against D on the grounds of unnecessary or unduly protracted delay.