Youth Court Decisions How to Use Full list of key titles CYPFA section Date

R v Slade & Hamilton (28 February 2005) CA245/04, CA266/04, Anderson P, Hammond and William Young JJ

Name: R v Slade & Hamilton
Unreported:
File number: CA245/04, CA266/04,
Court: Court of Appeal
Location: Wellington
Date: 28 February 2005
Judge: Anderson P, Hammond and William Young JJ
Charge: Murder
CYPFA:
Key title: Sentencing in the adult Courts – Other; Sentencing in the adult Courts – application of Youth Court principles

Summary: The Court of Appeal ruled that a minimum non-parole period of 17 years under s104 Sentencing Act 2002, could be so crushing for a young person that it would be manifestly unjust to impose it. In R v Slade & Hamilton two youths appealed against sentences of life imprisonment with a minimum 17-year non-parole period for murder. The pair (then 16), along with a third youth, had viciously attacked and robbed a passer-by who later died of massive head injuries. Section 104 requires that the 17 year minimum be imposed where certain factors are present during the murder unless the Court is satisfied that “it would be manifestly unjust to do so”. The Court of Appeal held that this was a case where s104 applied and then considered whether a 17 year sentence of actual imprisonment would fall so heavily on the young men that it would be “genuinely crushing and destructive of their lives and therefore manifestly unjust”.

The ringleader in the offence, Hamilton, was particularly brutal and lacking in remorse, and the Court had little difficulty in dismissing his appeal. Slade, whose involvement had been more peripheral, although not minimal, and who nevertheless faced the full 17-year sentence, presented a greater challenge to the Court.

The Court stressed that there is no youth exemption to s104 but noted evidence showing that adolescents’ developmental levels are different to those of adults. Statistics show a high degree of violent offending amongst youths but offending tails off once offenders reach their twenties. Registered consultant psychologist, Dr Ian Lambie, set out the reasons for this in a report for the defence:

It is widely accepted that adolescents do not possess either the same developmental level of cognitive or psychological maturity as adults (Steinberg & Scott, 2003). Adolescents have difficulty regulating their moods, impulses and behaviours (Spear, 2001). Immediate and concrete rewards, along with the reward of peer approval, weigh more heavily in their decisions and hence they are less likely than adults to think through the consequences of their actions. Adolescents’ decision-making capacities are immature and their autonomy constrained. Their ability to make good decisions is mitigated by stressful, unstructured settings and the influence of others. They are more vulnerable than adults to the influence of coercive circumstances such as provocation, duress and threat and are more likely to make riskier decisions when in groups. Adolescents’ desire for peer approval, and fear of rejection, affects their choices even without clear coercion (Moffitt, 1993). Also, because adolescents are more impulsive than adults, it may take less of a threat to provoke an aggressive response from an adolescent.

Dr Lambie’s report also referred to the high levels of depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation and self-injurious behaviour, and victimisation from other inmates that adolescents experience in prison. Further, adult institutions offer fewer health and mental health services for adolescents than for adult prisoners. The Court noted the policy implications arising for the criminal justice sphere from this evidence, particularly in addressing the causes of offending.

The Court stated that cases such as the present can only turn on their own facts, having regard particularly to the intent of the perpetrator, their actual participation in the wrongful event, and their “attitude” to what occurred. In this case, Slade showed some empathy and awareness and, although his involvement was not minimal, he was not the principal perpetrator and could not be considered to be on all fours with Hamilton for the purposes of s104.

Considering his age, abusive and deprived upbringing and the crushing nature of a sentence such as this for a 17 year old, the Court decided that this would be a case where manifest injustice would result from the lengthy non-parole period. Consequently, Slade’s appeal was allowed and the 17 year minimum non-parole period was set aside. His sentence of life imprisonment remained.