

**LEGAL COMPLAINTS REVIEW OFFICER
ĀPIHA AROTAKE AMUAMU Ā-TURE**

[2020] NZLCRO 93

Ref: LCRO 100/2020

CONCERNING

an application for review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006

AND

CONCERNING

a determination of the [Area] Standards Committee [X]

BETWEEN

FT

Applicant

AND

D and O CM

Respondents

DECISION

Introduction

[1] Mr FT has applied for a review of a decision by the [Area] Standards Committee [X], which had, following completion of a conduct investigation, entered an unsatisfactory conduct finding against Mr FT. That finding was accompanied by a low-level costs order.

[2] The Standards Committee delivered its decision on 14 April 2020.

[3] Mr FT lodged his application to review the Committee's decision on 2 June 2020.

[4] Review applications must be filed within 30 working days after a copy or notice of the determination is served on, given to or otherwise brought to the attention of the applicant for review. In the absence of proof to the contrary, service of the Committee's decision is presumed to have occurred on the fifth working day after it is made, given or performed or exercised.¹

¹ Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 198(b).

[5] In order to comply with the statutory timeframe prescribed for filing a review application, Mr FT was required to file his review application on or before 5 PM on Wednesday 27 May 2020.

[6] Mr FT's application was clearly filed out of time.

[7] The approach historically adopted by Legal Complaints Review Officers (Review Officers) when considering applications filed out of time has been to decline to proceed the review.

[8] It has been noted in many decisions that there is no provision in the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act) for a Review Officer to extend the timeframe within which an application for review must be lodged.²

[9] It has also been observed that in some cases hardship may result in the strict application of the time limit prescribed by s 198 of the Act.³

[10] In normal circumstances, Mr FT's failure to file his application in time would be fatal to his review application, however, as the time frame engaged by his application traverses in part a time of most uncommon circumstances, being the time during which New Zealand was subject to lockdown as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis, a more careful assessment as to whether Mr FT's application is able to proceed is required.

[11] The need for a more attentive consideration is rendered more critical, as a consequence of Parliament's recent passing of an amendment to the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006, that amendment implemented through sch 6 of the COVID-19 Response (Further Management Measures) Legislation Act 2020.⁴

[12] The new sch 2 of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 provides at cl 1:

- (1) In relation to a proceedings before it, a court may, in its discretion, extend or shorten the time appointed by rules of court or an enactment, or fixed by court order, for doing an act or taking a step on the terms that the court thinks just if satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to do so because of circumstances relating to COVID-19.
- (2) In this schedule, **court** includes a tribunal.

[13] The first question to consider is whether a review conducted by Review Officers properly falls within the definition of work carried out by a tribunal.

² *D v T* LCRO 36/2009 (27 March 2009), *LCRO 190-2017* (6 November 2017), and *KX v WA* LCRO 84-2012 (30 April 2012).

³ *D v T* LCRO 36/2009 (27 March 2009), *LCRO 230-2017* (15 December 2017).

⁴ Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006, sch 2, cl 1.

[14] That inquiry is necessary in order to establish whether the discretion allowed under sch 2 of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 which permits courts or tribunals to extend the timeframe for filing applications, ameliorates the strict approach Review Officers have historically adopted when considering review applications that have been filed out of time.

[15] The function of a Review Officer is to exercise the powers of review conferred on the Review Officer by the Act.⁵

[16] The Review Officer's role is a creature of statute.

[17] Whilst it is commonplace for the office from which the administration of the work of the Review Officers is managed to be referred to as the Legal Complaints Review Office, the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 does not provide for the creation of a Legal Complaints Review Office.

[18] Review Officers are appointed by the Minister of Justice, following consultation with the New Zealand Law Society.⁶

[19] Review Officers are appointed under a ministerial warrant.

[20] A stated purpose of the Act is to provide for a more responsive regulatory regime in relation to lawyers and conveyancers.⁷

[21] The regulatory regime established under the Act provides for a three-tier approach to the investigation of conduct complaints.

[22] Disciplinary investigations which engage a consideration of the question as to whether a lawyer has been guilty of conduct at the more serious end of the disciplinary spectrum (misconduct) are heard before the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal.

[23] The fact that the more serious conduct issues are determined by a statutory body specifically described as a tribunal, may raise further question as to whether the work of a Review Officer falls comfortably within the definition of work carried out by a tribunal.

[24] Black's Law Dictionary defines tribunal as a "court or other adjudicative body".⁸

⁵ Section 192 of the Act.

⁶ Section 190(2) of the Act.

⁷ Section 3(2)(b) of the Act.

⁸ Bryan Garner *Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed, 2019)* (online loose-leaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at Tribunal.

[25] It is undeniably the case that Review Officers carry out an adjudicative function.

[26] A number of decisions from the High Court have reinforced that a Legal Complaints Review Officer is a quasi-judicial officer.⁹

[27] In *U v Legal Complaints Review Officer*, Faire J listed the following provisions of the Act as illustrating that a Review Officer is a quasi-judicial officer:¹⁰

- (a) Section 206(2) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 grants the LCRO the power to hold hearings or, with the consent of the parties, to reach a determination on the papers;
- (b) Section 206(5) states that the LCRO is entitled to regulate her own procedure, subject to the requirements of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and rules made thereunder;
- (c) Counsel and witnesses have the same privileges and immunities as if they were in a court of law when appearing before the first defendant pursuant to cls 8 and 9 of the Third Schedule of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006;
- (d) By s 211, the LCRO has the power to confirm, modify or reverse any decision of a Standards Committee and to exercise any of the powers which were, or could have been, exercised by the Standards Committee;
- (e) By s 209 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, the LCRO has the power to direct the Standards Committee to reconsider the matter and, in that case, the Standards Committee must have regard to the direction given by the first defendant and the reasons for it;
- (f) The LCRO is entitled to order costs pursuant to s 210(1) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. Such orders are enforceable as a final judgment pursuant to s 215(1);
- (g) Clause 11 of the Third Schedule provides the LCRO with an immunity from civil or criminal liability in relation to acts or omissions in the course of carrying out her functions, duties or powers unless she has acted in bad faith; and
- (h) Section 262 provides that wilfully obstructing or deceiving the LCRO is an offence punishable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding \$25,000.

[28] In undertaking their decision-making role in their capacity as quasi-judicial officers, Review Officers are clearly carrying out adjudicative work in the nature of that conducted by a tribunal.

⁹ See *Zhao v legal Complaints Review Officer* [2013] NZHC 1052, [2013] NZAR 917 at [18], *Deliu v Hong* HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-3758, 18 December 2012 at [13].

¹⁰ *U v Legal Complaints Review Officer* HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-6350, 3 June 2011 at [54]–[62]. The LCRO is referred to as the defendant in these proceedings.

[29] Regulation 5 of the Court Security Regulations 2019 records those bodies designated as a tribunal under the Courts Security Act 1999. Legal Complaints Review Officers are listed in sch 2 of the Regulations as a designated tribunal.

[30] I am satisfied that the Legal Complaints Review Officer constitutes a tribunal for the purposes of sch 2 of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006.

[31] On 29 May 2020, the Review Office received an email from Mr FT attaching a review application. That application did not attach a copy of the Standards Committee decision. Nor had Mr FT made payment of the filing fee.

[32] On receipt of the application, a case manager contacted Mr FT to advise that:

- (a) His application appeared to have been filed out of time.
- (b) An application could not be accepted for filing until the requisite filing fee was paid.
- (c) It would be helpful for him to forward submissions setting out explanation for the late filing of his application.

[33] Mr FT advised the case manager that he had couriered the application to the LCRO, together with a cheque for the filing fee.

[34] Mr FT's application, together with filing fee was received on 2 June 2020.

[35] By way of explanation for the late filing, Mr FT submitted that:

- (a) He had not received the Committee's decision of 14 April 2020, until he returned to his office on 18 April 2020, when the COVID-19 lockdown had been reduced to level 3.
- (b) He considered it unreasonable to include the lockdown days as working days.

[36] Mr FT sought an extension of two days for the filing of his application.

[37] Section 198 of the Act provides:

Applications for review

Every application for a review under section 193 must—

- (a) be in the prescribed form; and

- (b) be lodged with the Legal Complaints Review Officer within 30 working days after a copy or notice of the determination, requirement, or order made, or the direction given, or the performance or exercise of the function or power, by the Standards Committee (or by any person on its behalf or with its authority) is served on, given to, or otherwise brought to the attention of, the applicant for review (which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to have occurred on the fifth working day after it is made, given, or performed or exercised); and
- (c) be accompanied by the prescribed fee (if any).

[38] The original wording of s 198 provided that the 30-working day period began on the day that the Committee's determination was made. The effect of this was that the time for filing a review application had already started to run before the applicant was aware the determination had been issued and provided with a copy.

[39] Section 198 was amended by the Lawyers and Conveyancers Amendment Bill 2010. When the Bill was first introduced, the general policy statement set out the explanation for amending s 198 of the Act.¹¹

- (a) New section 198(b) ensures that those applications must be lodged within a 30-working-day period commencing on the day after a copy or notice of the decision or action is brought to the attention of the applicant for review.
- (b) New section 198(b) also ensures that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a copy or notice of that kind is presumed to have been brought to the attention of the applicant for review on the fifth working-day after the decision or action.
- (c) By contrast under section 198(b), the 30-working-day period for lodging those applications starts when the decision or action is made or taken. The period for lodging those applications thus starts to run before the relevant decisions or actions are brought to the attention of possible applicants for review.

[40] It is clear that the reasoning for the amendment was to clarify that the 30-working day period runs from the day after the determination is served on, given to or otherwise brought to the attention of an applicant. This is to ensure that there is sufficient time for an application for review to be lodged.

[41] The second part of s 198(b) (the presumption of service) need only be addressed if it is not clear when the applicant was provided with a copy of the determination, where the determination has not been served on or given to the applicant.

[42] There are two critical elements to s 198. First, the section ensures that applicants have adequate time to file an application for review. Secondly, the section imposes obligation on an applicant to file their application promptly. This is intended to

¹¹ Lawyers and Conveyancers Amendment Bill 2010 (120-1) at the explanatory note, referring to cl 10.1.

ensure that the statutory objective of having complaints dealt with expeditiously is achieved.

[43] The provisions of s 198 of the Act are stated in mandatory terms. There is no statutory discretion to ameliorate their harshness, other than the ability for applicants to rebut the presumption that the decision was served on them within five working days after the decision was delivered.

[44] It is also important to note that an application for review is not lodged unless it is in the prescribed form and accompanied by the necessary filing fee. This means that both must be lodged within the 30-working day period.

[45] In *KX v WA LCRO* 84-2012 (30 April 2012), this Office held:

[9] For the avoidance of doubt, the statutory requirement is for a review application to be "lodged with the Legal Complaints Review Officer within 30 working days after the determination...", together with the fee. (Underlining added). There can be no lodgement of documents after the closing time of the Registry, which is generally recognised to be between the normal working hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. This is supported by *AEL Group Ltd v Kensington Swan Lawyers* 31/7/08, Associate Judge Christiansen, HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-1225. There the Court found that service on a law firm after 5:00 p.m. on a business day would not be effective (although in the circumstances considered by the Court service by facsimile prior to 5:00 p.m. was effective.) In this case the review application was lodged with this office the following day, when staff were in a position to receive and date stamp it, this being 19 April.

[46] Mr FT submits that his application was filed two days out of time. It was in fact filed four days out of time as the application, together with the required filing fee, was received on 2 June 2020.

[47] Adopting the long-held view that an LCRO has no jurisdiction to extend the time for filing a review, Mr FT's application would not be accepted for filing irrespective as to whether the application had been filed two or four days late.

[48] Attention then turns to the question as to whether Mr FT's application should receive the benefit of the discretion provided under sch 2 of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006, and be accepted for review.

[49] In considering the exercise of the discretion available, a Review Officer must be satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to allow the extension, because of "**circumstances relating to COVID-19**" (emphasis added). Every case must be considered on its particular facts.

[50] Neither "necessary" or "desirable" require extensive amplification of their readily understood meanings. Necessary simply conveys a sense of something that must be

done. Desirability suggests, particularly in this context, the appropriateness of doing the right thing, specifically remedying those situations where there is potential for an injustice to occur.

[51] Simply put, sch 2 of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 is intended to ensure that no party's opportunity to pursue an available legal remedy, is frustrated as a consequence of being adversely impacted by COVID-19 circumstances.

[52] As noted, each case is to be considered on its individual merits, but it is my view that it would not have been intended by Parliament that the mere fact that the normal timeframe allowed for filing a review application overlapped with the various government-imposed lockdown levels, would in itself provide sufficient grounds for an extension to the timeframe for filing a review application.

[53] It would be expected that an applicant provide evidence to support their argument that COVID-19-related circumstances materially compromised their ability to file the application in time.

[54] It is not sufficient for an applicant to plead that their capacity to file an application was frustrated by COVID-19 circumstances, without adequately particularising the aspects of those circumstances that made it difficult or impossible for them to comply.

[55] If the legislature considered that the most appropriate way to protect parties whose ability to take a step in proceedings before a court or tribunal had been compromised by COVID-19 related circumstances was to specify a period of time during which time frames for filing applications were suspended, it would have adopted that approach.

[56] In allowing a discretion to tribunals to extend time frames in circumstances where the decision maker considers it both necessary or desirable to do so, it inevitably follows that applicants are required to provide explanation of their circumstances.

[57] The evidential burden on applicants should not, consistent with the consumer protection focus of the Act, be unduly onerous, but nor should the burden be negligible.

[58] An applicant's failure to lodge their application in time must be demonstrably linked to circumstances which, examined reasonably and carefully, would lead to fair conclusion that the applicant was unable to meet their obligations to file in time.

[59] Factors which may be considered of relevance could include:

- (a) An applicant's ability to access files.

- (b) Difficulty in accessing the technology needed to download review documents or dispatch the review application.
- (c) An applicant's isolation from family members or other persons whose assistance they require in the preparation of the review application.
- (d) The time available to an applicant to prepare their application prior to the imposition of the period of lockdown.
- (e) Difficult family circumstances.

[60] The list is by no means exhaustive.

[61] To the extent that Mr FT introduces argument that COVID-19 circumstances affected his ability to file his application in time, his reliance on COVID-19 factors is minimal. He simply argues that his access to the Committee decision was delayed for a period of three days because of the COVID-19 lockdown.

[62] Adopting a more broad-brush approach, Mr FT argues that it would be unreasonable to include the lockdown days as working days.

[63] In my view, the disruption to Mr FT occasioned by COVID-19 circumstances was minimal, and insufficient to persuade me that it is either necessary or desirable that an extension be granted for the filing of his application.

[64] Mr and Mrs CM, given opportunity to comment on Mr FT's submissions, were sceptical of the explanation provided, noting that they considered it "dubious" that Mr FT was unable to work during the lockdown period, particularly considering the nature of Mr FT's work, and the nature of modern technology.

[65] I accept Mr FT's explanation that he was unable to attend at his office for a brief period of time, but it is my view that a practising lawyer with the resources available to them, would have had ample time to attend to filing an application, and an appreciation of the need to do so within the time frames explained in the Committee decision.

[66] Nor do I accept Mr FT's argument, (for the reasons explained at [55] above) that it is possible to take the position that calculation of working days be suspended during the period of lockdown.

[67] Having concluded that there are no grounds which persuade me that it is necessary or desirable to extend the time limit for Mr FT to lodge his application for review, I find that his application was not lodged within 30 working days after the date on

which the Committee's determination was served, given to or otherwise brought to his attention.

[68] Mr FT's application for review is not accepted for filing.

DATED this 9th day of JUNE 2020

R Maidment
Legal Complaints Review Officer

In accordance with s 213 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 copies of this decision are to be provided to:

Mr FT as the Applicant
Mr and Mrs CM as the Respondents
[Area] Standards Committee [X]
New Zealand Law Society