Hon Andrew Little, Minister of Justice

Proposed model for establishing a Criminal Cases Review Commission

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<th>Date</th>
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### Action sought

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<th>Direct official actions</th>
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<td>Direct officials to consult with departments, the judiciary, members of the legal profession, academics and other key stakeholders to test and refine the proposals in this briefing.</td>
<td>15 December 2017</td>
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<td>Direct officials to draft a Cabinet paper, in consultation with other agencies, on the basis of advice in this briefing.</td>
<td>15 December 2017</td>
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<td>Direct officials to provide further substantive advice on a proposed test for referral to the courts, and other residual policy issues, early in the New Year.</td>
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<td>Forward a copy of this briefing to the Minister of State Services.</td>
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### Minister’s office to complete

- [ ] Noted
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- [ ] Not seen by Minister

**Minister’s office’s comments**
Purpose

1. This briefing outlines a proposed model for a New Zealand Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), including timeframes for policy and legislative development.

2. We seek your agreement to consult with departments and experts on the proposals in this paper, and to begin drafting and consult on a Cabinet paper for March 2018.

Executive summary

3. The success of the CCRC will depend primarily on the perception of its independence, its ability to resolve case reviews in a timely manner, and transparency in its processes. These objectives have influenced our design choices, along with comparisons to CCRCs in other jurisdictions and comparable investigative bodies in New Zealand.

4. The CCRC’s function would be to refer a conviction or sentence in a criminal case back to the appeal courts where it considers a miscarriage of justice might have occurred. The design of the CCRC is constrained in some respects by this function, as referral has significant constitutional implications. There is, however, an opportunity to include some new developments in the exercise of this function that we believe will enhance public perceptions of independence, timeliness and effectiveness.

5. For example, we suggest the CCRC be able to begin case reviews on its own initiative, as well as receiving applications from convicted persons and their representatives. To assist its investigation, the CCRC would also have powers to obtain information from public bodies and private individuals.

6. The design of the CCRC is complex and the issues can be resolved in different ways. Targeted consultation with departments, the judiciary, representative leaders of the law profession, academics and other key stakeholders on these proposals will enable us to test, refine and amend the model ahead of a Cabinet paper in March 2018.

Background

7. The Government has a coalition agreement commitment to establish a CCRC. A CCRC is an independent public body set up to review suspected miscarriages of justice and refer appropriate cases back to the appeal courts. In New Zealand, this function is currently performed through the Royal prerogative of mercy.

8. On 9 November 2017, the Ministry of Justice provided you with initial briefing on establishing a CCRC which:

8.1. described the purpose and main features of a CCRC

8.2. provided an overview of international CCRC models in the United Kingdom (England and Wales), Scotland and Norway

8.3. summarised the key considerations for the establishment of a New Zealand CCRC, and sought direction on next steps.

9. Officials undertook to provide you with substantive advice and seek your decisions on the key considerations for establishing a CCRC matters before the end of the year, including advice on the estimated cost of establishing a CCRC.
10. You have indicated that you intend to have a CCRC operating in early 2019, with enabling legislation passed in 2018. In light of your discussion with officials about Budget 2018 initiatives, the Ministry has prepared a contingency bid for Budget 2018 to ensure funding is available to establish a CCRC within this timeframe. Further detail on the financial implications of the CCRC is provided below.

**Relevant considerations in the design of the CCRC**

11. This section examines the objectives and relevant considerations in establishing a CCRC that inform its design.

**Enhancing public confidence should be the key design consideration**

12. Every miscarriage of justice has the potential to undermine confidence in the justice system and robust systems to identify and address them are vital.

13. In New Zealand, a person who believes they have suffered a miscarriage of justice may apply to the Governor-General for the exercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy.

14. As in other jurisdictions that ultimately established a CCRC, concerns have been raised regarding the independence, timeliness and capacity of mechanisms for investigating possible miscarriages of justice in New Zealand. In response, over the years successive reports have made a case for establishing a CCRC-like body. A summary of these reports is attached as Appendix One.

15. The principal benefit cited for establishing such a body is that greater organisational independence from Ministers is likely to help to address some negative perceptions about the way the function is currently exercised. Indeed, in our view, the primary advantage that a CCRC offers is the perception of independence, including the ability for Ministers to maintain an arms-length distance from involvement in criminal cases.

16. Further, a CCRC with dedicated resource and appropriate investigative powers could also improve the timeliness of and capacity to undertake reviews into possible miscarriages of justice. There is no evidence to suggest that advice on Royal prerogative applications is not of a high quality, however, the nature of the current process means there will always be competing priorities that affect timeliness.

17. A lack of dedicated resource also means fewer opportunities to specialise in handling potential miscarriages of justice. Reliance on cooperation alone to obtain documents, without the power to compel parties to comply with officials’ requests, can also lead to delays.

18. There is also an opportunity to increase public awareness about miscarriages of justice and the review process. International CCRCs appear to have developed more, and more detailed, public information, including case statistics, formal casework policies, and research reports than are available in New Zealand.

**There are several features of the current system that a CCRC should retain**

19. To help achieve public confidence and constitutional legitimacy, there are aspects of the current system that should not change. For example, the principles that reflect our

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1 See, for example, Neville Trendle, *The Royal Prerogative of Mercy: A Review of New Zealand Practice* (Ministry of Justice, 2003); Sir Thomas Thorp, *Miscarriages of Justice* (Legal Research Foundation, 2005).
constitutional arrangements and good practice in dealing with suspected miscarriages of justice, including:

19.1. criminal responsibility is decided by the courts

19.2. convicted persons should generally have exhausted their appeal rights before seeking intervention from the executive

19.3. intervention by the executive should be compatible with the constitutional relationship between the executive and the judiciary

19.4. referral back to the court should normally be based on new information or argument that is capable of giving rise to a successful appeal, and

19.5. applicants should have a fair opportunity to make their best case for intervention and to an adequate statement of reasons for a decision.

20. In our view, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the CCRC will be enhanced if it is based on these principles. However, we also consider there will be a need to change some aspects of the current system in order to enhance public confidence in the justice system.

How the CCRC’s success is defined will also influence design

21. A clear idea of what constitutes success for the CCRC is important, particularly for questions of institutional design.

22. As above, in our view the success of the CCRC will depend primarily on the perception of its independence, its ability to resolve case reviews in a timely manner, and transparency in its processes. These objectives will therefore influence design choices.

23. Measuring success will be complex, however. For example, a broad test for referral to the courts would increase the volume of applications and cases referred to the courts, which could be viewed as a success. In this regard, we note the conclusion of the UK House of Commons Justice Committee that “… if a bolder approach leads to 5 more failed appeals but one additional miscarriage being corrected, then that is of clear benefit.”

24. Equally, it is not clear the rate of referral or number of convictions set aside will increase. Many applications are likely to be refused and the rate of referral may, therefore, actually drop from its current level of about 9 percent.

25. CCRCs in the United Kingdom and Scotland, for example, refer fewer of their total applications than New Zealand does under the Royal prerogative, and a lower percentage of convictions referred are set aside by the courts. If these figures are repeated in New Zealand, the CCRC may be subjected to criticism that it has failed to produce a quantitatively better outcome than the status quo.

Proposed model for establishing a CCRC

26. This section provides initial substantive advice on a proposed model for the establishment of a New Zealand CCRC, including the:

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3 By comparison, the UK CCRC and Scottish CCRC have about a 3.3 percent and 5.7 percent referral rate respectively.
26.1. functions, structure and powers of the CCRC

26.2. process for reviewing decisions made by the CCRC

26.3. residual role for the Royal prerogative of mercy, and

26.4. financial implications of establishing a CCRC.

27. In general, we have tried to propose initial options that provide sufficient procedural flexibility for the CCRC to carry out its core function so that all appropriate convictions can be referred back to the Courts in a timely manner.

28. We propose to undertake consultation with departments, complaints bodies, and academic and legal experts to test and refine the proposals below ahead of seeking Cabinet decisions in March 2018.

The CCRC’s function would be to refer possible miscarriages of justice to the courts

29. As with overseas models, the CCRC should have the statutory power to refer any conviction or sentence in a criminal case back to the appeal courts where it considers a miscarriage of justice might have occurred. This would replace section 406 of the Crimes Act 1961, under which the referral power is currently exercised by the Governor-General on Ministerial advice.

30. The referral would generally be made to the Court of Appeal, or the High Court where the person’s right of appeal was to the District Court or High Court, as it is currently.

31. As noted above, the context of having to refer cases to the courts imposes some constraints on design.

32. For example, it clearly acknowledges the proper role of the courts as determinants of criminal responsibility and, therefore, precludes the possibility of the CCRC acting as a body which effectively reinvestigates criminal cases or determining liability. We do not propose any changes to the status quo in this regard. However, there remains room for developments in how cases may come to the CCRC, its investigative abilities, and the decision-making process on whether to make a referral.

Convicted persons and their representatives may apply to the CCRC to review a case

33. The primary means of triggering a review by the CCRC will be on application. In our view, persons eligible to apply should have some direct connection to the case, and should include the convicted person or their representative.4

34. We do not propose, however, that a person’s estate, or the representative of an estate, may apply in respect of a deceased person.

35. The UK CCRC can make a reference to the courts in relation to a deceased person’s case. However, this is possible because the UK appeals system enables someone to be approved by the Court of Appeal to represent the deceased.

4 See, for example, Criminal Records (Expungement for Historical Homosexual Convictions) Bill cls 14. Both the eligible person or their representative could include an agent, a donee of an enduring power of attorney, or a welfare guardian acting on behalf of any of these categories of person.
36. There is no comparable provision in New Zealand's general criminal law for an appeal to be held where a person is deceased. We therefore do not recommend the CCRC be able to investigate, or make a reference, in relation to an application made on behalf of a deceased person. This would require a broader consideration of the appeals process.

The CCRC should also have a limited ability to review cases on its own initiative

37. We recommend the CCRC be able to review cases on its own initiative. This may require the CCRC to adopt a more inquisitorial approach to reviewing suspected miscarriages of justice than exists under the current system, but it would not extend to reopening or reinvestigating a case with a view to determining criminal responsibility.

38. The CCRC might, for example, proactively assist a potential applicant to identify possible grounds for an application. We anticipate this ability would only be exercised in cases where an individual lacks the resources to make an application, and may have no recourse to legal assistance or someone to champion their cause to the CCRC.

39. The ability for the CCRC to initiate a case review has several advantages. Primarily, it would take some of the burden away from those applicants who may require assistance in forming an application, or who may be unaware of the CCRC. Given the resources the State puts into securing a conviction, there may be a reasonable expectation that some resource and initiative will be expended by a CCRC to help identify and address wrongful convictions. Having an independent body that has the ability to review convictions that are a source of public disquiet is likely to enhance public confidence, and respond to the concern that the current system is solely reactive.

40. Lastly, an own initiative investigative power would provide the CCRC with a discretion to open a review where a person not eligible to apply to the CCRC brings to light a possible miscarriage of justice in relation to another person.

41. In practice, we do not anticipate many reviews will be opened on the CCRC's initiative. Indeed, we are not currently aware of any such own initiative reviews being instigated by the UK or Scottish CCRCs. As well as the expense involved in opening additional reviews, it is likely that, by the time a possible miscarriage may have come to light, either the convicted person or a representative will have either applied or signalled an intention to do so.

42. Where the CCRC decides to open a case review on its own initiative, it should as soon as possible approach the relevant convicted person to secure their consent to proceed. A referral is not possible without an appellant, and the CCRC should therefore not exercise its powers to review a case where the relevant person is not seeking or does not support the terms of a referral.

Decisions on whether to fully review a case should be dealt with under case-handling policies

43. At this stage, we do not recommend including any statutory grounds for the CCRC to refuse to investigate a case. In our view, the criteria for accepting or refusing to fully review a case may be more appropriately handled through the CCRC developing and publishing casework policies and procedures.

44. None of the international CCRC models appear to have express statutory grounds to refuse to undertake a review. Rather, the international CCRCs have all developed and published some form of guidance to assist people in preparing an application and understanding the process. The UK CCRC, for example, has released a particularly
comprehensive set of formal memoranda setting out their approach to their casework, including a two-stage decision-making process on applications

45. Conversely, complaints bodies in New Zealand often have an explicit power to decide to take no action on an application. The grounds for exercising such a power include, for example, that the application is vexatious or minor in nature. We understand complaints bodies find this useful, and it may give confidence to the CCRC not to pursue applications that clearly have no merit.

46. Our initial view, however, is that it may be preferable not to specify specific grounds to refuse an application in statute. The power to refer a case back to the courts is a permissive one, and providing the CCRC with discretion as to how it wants to handle issues such as reapplications, complaints procedures, and the decision-making process would give valuable flexibility.

Reasons for decisions on referral should be provided to relevant parties

47. Disclosure of the reasons underpinning a decision is vital for the principles of transparency and natural justice. Currently:

47.1. the applicant gets a copy of the full report from the Ministry to the Minister, on which the Governor-General’s decision is based, and

47.2. where there is a referral, the reasons for the referral are set out in the Order in Council which effects the referral and this is published in the Gazette.

48. Reasons for declining an application are not made public under the present system.

49. We consider it is important that the CCRC’s rationale for making a reference to the courts, or not, continues to be made available to the courts and affected parties, and recommend that the CCRC be required to provide the information listed above.

50. We also recommend a requirement for the CCRC to make available its reasons for declining an application publicly available. While the level of detail and need for appropriate redactions would necessarily vary according to the details of the case and reasonable expectations of privacy, proactive publication would enable scrutiny of the CCRC’s process and application of the test for referral. This would, in turn, promote confidence in the CCRC’s work or, at least, identify possible issues early should the rationale be criticised.

Review should be completed and reasons provided if an applicant dies during investigation

51. As above, we do not recommend enabling a reference to be made in respect of a deceased person. However, we recommend that the CCRC be able to complete a review where the relevant convicted person applies and subsequently passes away before a decision is made. While the CCRC could not make a reference, it could, where appropriate, still provide its conclusions of its review to the person’s representative or estate. This would enable any potential causes of miscarriages of justice to be identified and, if necessary, acted upon by relevant authorities, without the risks to alignment with the New Zealand appeals process.
Further work is required to recommend a test for referral to the courts

52. Legislation to establish the CCRC will need to specify the ground or grounds on which referral to the court is permitted. We have not yet reached a view on the appropriate test, though we have identified a number of options including:

52.1. where there is a ‘real possibility’ that a conviction or sentence will be set aside (per UK CCRC)

52.2. if a miscarriage of justice may have occurred and referral is in the interests of justice (per Scottish CCRC), and

52.3. where satisfied that a miscarriage has occurred due to an unreasonable jury verdict, or a miscarriage has occurred for any reason (per Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 232).

53. The test for referral is arguably the most important element of the CCRC’s remit – the threshold set will inform the number of referrals. Any concerns or critics of the test are likely to be a main cause of any lack of public confidence in a CCRC. For example, the statutory test for case referral for the UK CCRC, and how the test is applied, has been the subject of ongoing debate. ⁵

54. Part of this question is whether there is a need for a statutory requirement that applicants should be expected to exhaust all their appeals before a referral to the courts may be made.

55. Strong conventions, reflecting the separation of powers, underpin the exercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy. By convention, applicants are expected to use their appeals before applying for the prerogative of mercy. This is because the prerogative of mercy is not an opportunity to repeat arguments or re-examine evidence that have already been considered by the courts.

56. It is also not the Executive’s role to substitute its judgement for that of an appellate court, particularly when the court has yet to be given an opportunity to exercise that judgement. This is the position in the UK, Scotland and NZ.

57. Section 406 of the Crimes Act, however, makes it explicit that the Governor-General may make a reference ‘at any time’ regardless of whether the applicant has exercised their rights of appeal. The Scottish CCRC may also make a reference at any time, regardless of appeal. ⁶ The UK CRRC may only make a reference if an appeal against the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence has been determined or leave to appeal against it has been refused; though this does allow for exceptional circumstances. ⁷

58. Explicitly limiting the ability of the CCRC to make a reference only to where appeal rights have been exhausted would lead to a lower workload. It would be a rare case, if any, that might legitimately lend itself to a review by the CCRC prior to appeals being exhausted. Creating a firm statutory rule that appeals must be exhausted, meanwhile, could lead to inflexibility.

⁵ See, for example, House of Commons Justice Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2014-15.
⁶ Refer Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 194B(1).
⁷ Refer Criminal Appeal Act 1995 (UK), s 13. Processes
59. Given the importance of settling on a test that is effective and constitutionally appropriate, we propose to consult on the test for referral in the New Year and provide you with further advice.

There will be a residual Royal prerogative of mercy role for the Governor-General

60. The CCRC will essentially inherit the responsibility from the Governor-General for examining miscarriages of justice and enabling them to be corrected, where necessary, by the courts. However, as the Royal prerogative of mercy remains in force via the Letters Patent, the CCRC reforms will need to address the relationship between the CCRC and any residual role for the prerogative of mercy.

61. We recommend that the referral power therefore needs to be split out in a way that:

   61.1. makes it plain that the CCRC is the body to which miscarriage of justice allegations should be made and that applicants should not see the prerogative of mercy simply as an additional or alternative remedy;

   61.2. enables the Governor-General (or Minister of Justice) to refer applications for the prerogative of mercy that allege a miscarriage of justice direct to the CCRC for it to deal with under its statutory authority, and

   61.3. nevertheless, preserves the authority of the Governor-General to exercise the prerogative powers delegated by the Letter Patent, albeit that the occasion for exercise of those powers will be extremely rare.

62. We also recommend enabling the Minister of Justice, to request the opinion of the CCRC on a matter related to the possible exercise of the prerogative of mercy, for example on an application for a free pardon. These proposals will require specific testing with the Cabinet Office.

63. There is further work to do on how cases already being considered under the Royal prerogative should be handled once the CCRC has been established. We will provide further advice on this, and other transitional arrangements, in our subsequent briefing.

Some additional functions may also be required

64. In our view, a necessary aspect of the ability to refer a case back to the courts is the promotion of, and education in relation to, the CCRC’s functions.

65. Promotion of, and education about, the work of the CCRC’s work and the application process, could help to increase the number of viable applications and, regardless, the quality of the information contained in applications. It would also help to set clear expectations about how the process works and potentially increase overall satisfaction with the CCRC as a result.

66. We also recommend the CCRC be required to monitor trends in relation to their investigations into potential miscarriages of justice and to report to the relevant Minister(s) when appropriate. The requirement to report to the relevant Minister(s) may help to identify and address systemic issues in the area of miscarriages of justice.

67. Both activities, while technically beyond case review alone, are therefore vital to ensuring the CCRC’s work is publicised and effective.
68. We do not, however, recommend a statutory requirement for the CCRC to fulfil any further secondary functions at this stage.

69. Some stakeholders may raise the possibility of the CCRC having an advocacy function, as some other independent bodies in New Zealand do.

70. In our view, however, giving the CCRC secondary functions (including advocacy) risks distracting from its core purpose of identifying and addressing specific cases where a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. This risk may be particularly acute in the CCRC’s early stages of operation, where attention is more likely to be on how effectively it carries out its core mandate. Broadening the functions of the CCRC will also increase its operational costs.

71. We note, however, that there is nothing to prevent the CCRC choosing to engage in activities related to their functions should it think it necessary or desirable to do so should resources allow. While a statutory requirement to fulfil such functions sets a clear expectation, a requirement is not strictly necessary for the CCRC to perform those tasks.

**Membership of the CCRC should allow for diversity of skills and experience**

72. The composition of the membership of the CCRC will be critical in promoting confidence in its decision-making abilities and independence.

**Members should have appropriate experience and be representative of the community**

73. We recommend a statutory requirement that a portion of the membership to have legal qualifications. Legal expertise will be vital for assessing whether the test for referral has been met, and for appreciation of the complex legal questions that will inevitably arise during case reviews. The international CCRC models also require a portion of their membership to have legal qualifications.\(^8\)

74. Knowledge or experience in the justice system would also be an essential requirement for a portion of the CCRC membership. The UK and Scottish CCRCs also require that a portion of members have some particular knowledge or experience in the criminal justice system. This requirement would be a way of recognising that persons without legal qualifications will have valuable knowledge and experiences to contribute to the CCRC’s work and its decisions. For example, it may be useful to have members with scientific qualifications to inform discussions about forensic evidence, or people with experience in Police investigations.

75. Membership of the CCRC should also be representative of the community, including Iwi/Māori and women.

76. Representative membership of the CCRC, with the attendant broader range of skills and experience, may reinforce perceptions of its independence. Cultural and gender diversity of members would also be particularly valuable to ensure that cases involving possible structural discrimination and gendered patterns of violence are handled in an appropriate manner.

77. We do not, however, recommend requiring that any CCRC members be a judge or retired judge.

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\(^8\) One third of members in the UK and Scotland, and two thirds in Norway.
78. While having a judge on the CCRC need not be precluded *per se*, it could risk concerns around independence and lead to perceived conflicts of interest in relation to cases they have presided over.

Membership of the CCRC should consist of up to five members

79. We recommend that the CCRC consist of up to five members, including a Chief and Deputy Chief Commissioner.

80. This proposal is similar to the structure of the international CCRC models in the UK, Scotland and Norway.

81. The process of decision-making on a case review is largely the same across the UK, Scottish and Norwegian CCRC models. The reviews are carried out by CCRC staff and a recommendation is made to the members of the Commission. Cases where a reference is not recommended will usually be closed on decision of a single Commissioner (usually the Chair). Where a reference is recommended, or arguments are made both ways, a quorum of Commissioners will decide whether to make a reference.\(^9\)

82. Our initial view, however, is that the broader membership will enable the CCRC to have the necessary mix of skills and experience for its decision-making and governance. We also note that it would be possible that the three members beyond the Chief and Deputy Chief Commissioner could be part time.

The CCRC should be established as an Independent Crown Entity

83. Given the value placed upon independence in the rationale for establishing a CCRC, finding the appropriate organisational structure is critical.

84. Our initial view is that the CCRC is most appropriately established as an Independent Crown Entity (ICE).

85. An ICE is typically a quasi-judicial or investigative public body that is generally considered to be an appropriate model where, for example:^10

85.1. its activities are part of executive government

85.2. it does not have clear commercial objectives, and

85.3. there is a need for greater independence from Ministers to preserve public confidence in it.

86. The CCRC appears to meet all these criteria. The Royal prerogative is an executive function, and one of the key objectives in establishing a CCRC is to achieve independence from the core Executive.

87. There are, however, some disadvantages to the ICE model. For example, while Ministers are prevented from directing the body how to perform its functions, the relevant Minister can exert indirect influence through budget monitoring and the Statement of Intent process.

\(^9\) In the UK CCRC and Scottish CCCRC quorum is no fewer than three members, at least one of whom must have legal qualifications.

88. Establishing the CCRC as an independent statutory officer along the lines of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (the IGIS) may also be appropriate. The IGIS model would allow for the development of a completely bespoke office with, for example, tailored reporting requirements rather than the relatively intensive ICE reporting requirements.

89. On balance, however, we propose to proceed to consultation on the basis that an ICE model is most appropriate.

Consultation with State Services Commission on CCRC structure is required

90. The State Services Commissioner has particular responsibility for advising Ministers on proposals to establish, merge, or disestablish State sector agencies (other than State-owned enterprises). The Minister of State Services must also be consulted on Cabinet papers proposing to establish a new public body.

91. We therefore propose to specifically consult the State Services Commission as part of the preparation of a draft Cabinet paper and the Regulatory Impact Statement. We also recommend that you forward a copy of this briefing to the Minister of State Services to enable early consultation ahead of submission to Cabinet.

Information-gathering powers are required to ensure the CCRC’s effectiveness

92. To ensure the CCRC can work effectively, and complete reviews in a timely manner, we recommend the CCRC be given reasonable powers to obtain information, including written information and evidence under oath, from both public bodies and private persons.

93. Currently, the Ministry of Justice relies on cooperation for access to official documents, and on an applicant’s current and previous lawyers for information about the case and how it was handled. Witness interviews are undertaken with their consent and the provision of court files is at judicial discretion.

94. While the lack of statutory information-gathering powers has not proved an obstacle in practice, relying on cooperation alone can cause delays. For example, there may be competing priorities for the body or person information is being sought from and therefore information may not be provided in a timely manner.

95. New Zealand complaints bodies will generally have some powers to request information from public or private persons and bodies. Further, all international CCRC models have powers to compel information from a public or private body. These powers appear to have been helpful in those CCRCs’ work, including where failure to disclose information at trial was a key element in the apparent miscarriage of justice. ¹¹

96. It is important that information-gathering powers strike the right balance between an imperative to provide information, without creating cumbersome procedural processes or unjustifiably intruding on rights to freedom of expression and security against unreasonable search and seizure.

Cooperation and consent should always be preferred to compulsion of information

97. We suggest that the CCRC’s information gathering powers explicitly reflect that cooperation and consent ought to be the preferred means of obtaining relevant information. Cooperation is generally a more effective method of engagement than more coercive means that involve the delays and costs associated with court procedures. However, there are circumstances where reasonably constructed information-gathering powers may be necessary as a tool of last resort.

98. Court records would always be obtained as a matter of consent and cooperation under the access to court documents rules.12

Information should be compulsorily obtained from public bodies and private bodies where reasonable and necessary

99. We recommend giving the CCRC the power to require public bodies to supply information where the CCRC has reasonable grounds to believe the information is necessary for the purposes of reviewing a case, and that it is not able to obtain in the information in any other manner.13 We expect the kind of information the CCRC will be requesting from public bodies would include Police records and files from Crown Law.

100. The likely form this request will take is a notice requiring the public body to provide the information. By way of procedural safeguard, the notice will detail the information sought, the purpose for requesting the information and a timeframe for when the information is required.

Compelling information from private persons should be subject to a court order

101. We recommend that the CCRC also have the power to apply to court for an order requiring a private body to provide information. The information we expect to be requested from private bodies includes client files from lawyers14 and examination on oath of eye witnesses. In essence, this power would operate like a subpoena, and would likely only be required in very rare circumstances where a private individual or body refused to provide information.

102. If the CCRC does not have the power to compel individuals there is a risk that miscarriages will go unaddressed due to a lack of complete information. The Chair of the UK CCRC, which is not able to require information from private bodies, has stated that:

"you can be confident that there are miscarriages of justice that have gone unremedied because of the lack of that power." 15

103. Further, the power is seen as increasingly necessary there due to privatisation of some criminal justice services, including in forensic analysis.16

104. We recognise the different treatment of public and private bodies does not exist in the power New Zealand complaints bodies generally have to compel information. There is

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13 See, for example, Criminal Records (Expungement of Convictions for Historical Homosexual Offences) Bill, cl 16.
14 We do not propose overriding legal professional privilege – so access to any privileged material could only be on receipt of a waiver from the lawyer's client.
16 Ibid at [42].
also not a consistent approach in the international models to distinguishing between when and how a public or private actor can be required to provide information. For example, Scotland requires a court order be sought when obtaining information from any person, while the UK CCRC need not seek an order to obtain information in any case.

105. However, we believe it is necessary because a court order reflects the need for a higher level procedural safeguard for information held by private individuals. The courts are best placed to balance the rights of persons to not be compelled to express themselves\(^\text{17}\) with the need to access information to investigate suspected miscarriages of justice.

106. Requiring a court order also provides greater certainty that information is being obtained appropriately and thus reduces the risk of a judicial review later concluding the CCRC did not appropriately exercise their powers.

**A statutory right of appeal for CCRC decisions is not recommended**

107. We do not recommend providing for a statutory right of appeal of the CCRC’s determination on whether to refer a case. To include a right of appeal would risk complicating the constitutional relationship between the CCRC and the courts and jeopardise the principle of finality.

108. A challenge on the substance of the CCRC’s determination would effectively reopen the case for appeal regardless of the outcome of the CCRC’s review, and thus render the role of the CCRC moot.

109. Having both an internal review mechanism and judicial review will, in our view, provide the necessary safeguards to ensure the CCRC’s determinations are robust and lawfully made. An applicant could also reapply at a later date if they believed there was good reason for the CCRC to reconsider their case.

**Decisions should be subject to internal complaints policies and judicial review**

110. As noted earlier, it would be for the CCRC to develop an internal complaints procedure where an applicant is not satisfied with the CCRC’s conduct during a case review. Internal reviews are an effective way of identifying and correcting mistakes without the cost and publicity that an appeal to an external body or judicial review may attract.\(^\text{18}\)

111. The CCRC should also follow the example set internationally and provide draft copies of their report and findings to the applicant. This would provide the applicant with a right of reply to clarify or discuss certain matters. Again, this should help to lessen the need for judicial review to correct mistakes or provide a forum for the applicant to be heard.

112. Decisions of the CCRC will also be judicially reviewable, unless otherwise provided. Judicial review is an essential mechanism for maintaining the rule of law important, in that it ensures a person with an interest in a decision can challenge the lawfulness of that decision.

113. Judicial review actions of decisions made by the UK CCRC and the Scottish CCRC have been rare. Decisions from judicial review cases against the CCRCs in both

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\(^{17}\) Section 14 (freedom of expression) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 has been interpreted as including the right not to be compelled to say certain things or to provide certain information; see, for example, *Slaight Communications v Davidson* 59 DLR (4th) 416; *Wooley v Maynard* 430 US 705 (1977).

Scotland and the UK have emphasised that the courts will not override the CCRC judgement on a case.\textsuperscript{19} Even if the Court objects to a decision to not refer a case by the Commission on the merits, they may only rule on whether the decision was legally tenable and, if not, will rule that the CCRC should reconsider the case. Judicial review is not excluded in respect of other New Zealand complaints bodies either.

114. We therefore do not see compelling justification to oust judicial review in respect of decisions made by the CCRC.

Establishing a CCRC has direct and indirect financial implications

115. We believe it is important to provide adequate funding to the CCRC to ensure it is effective from initiation. As the success of this body is dependent on its ability to process applications in a timely manner adequate resourcing is crucial.

116. Policy decisions relating to the structure, function, powers and workload of the CCRC will impact the cost of the CCRC. However, our initial assumptions suggest that the CCRC will cost approximately \$9(2)(f)(iv) to carry out its functions. This cost assumes that there will be a significant increase in applications and assessment of cases, as compared to reviews under the Royal prerogative.\textsuperscript{20} The main ongoing cost is for the Commission’s staff, investigation and service costs including ICT and rent.

117. An additional estimated \$9(2)(f)(iv) will be required to cover flow on effects. This cost includes the estimated legal aid, retrials and the cost to Crown Law for supporting investigations. These estimates are like to change as the Budget bid is further refined and through consultation with other agencies.

118. We will continue to refine these assumptions as part of the policy development and

| Timeframes for policy and legislative development |

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, Regina v CCRC, ex parte Pearson [2001].
\textsuperscript{20} We have estimated an increase in the number of applications per year increase from an average of 8 to an average of 125 based on international models.
\textsuperscript{21} We have estimated that a 50 clause Bill of medium complexity takes approximately 3 days (approximately 3 months) for a 50 clause Bill of medium complexity.
Commencement of the legislation could be staggered to allow for ease of implementation

124. As part of the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the Ministry will need to develop an implementation plan for the establishment of a CCRC. Key elements of the implementation will include making appointments to the CCRC, procuring office space and IT services, hiring staff, and developing internal policies and case handling procedures.

125. We anticipate that management of the implementation phase will gradually transition from the Ministry to the CCRC itself. To enable this, we may want to consider staggering commencement of the legislation to allow, for example, appointments and hiring to take place as early as possible, with the substantive functions and powers of the CCRC commencing later when the necessary infrastructure is in place.

Next steps

126. If you agree, we will undertake stakeholder consultation to test the proposals in this paper and begin to draft a Cabinet paper and Regulatory Impact Statement for submission to Cabinet in s 9(2)(f)(iv). We will also provide you with a further substantive briefing on a proposal for referral to the courts, and other residual policy issues, early in the New Year.

127. Consultation would be kept confidential, and would include a variety of people with relevant experience and expertise. We anticipate producing a document summarising the proposals in this paper to these experts and request comment on the design. Their feedback will then help us to refine and, where necessary, recommend changes to the model proposed above.

128. Should you agree, we will provide you with updates about the progress of consultation, including with whom we have spoken, and a summary of their comments when available.
Recommendations

129. It’s recommended that you:

1. Direct officials to draft a Cabinet paper on the basis of the advice in this paper on a proposed model for establishing the Criminal Cases Review Commission  
   YES / NO

2. Direct officials to proceed to departmental consultation in order to test and refine the proposals in this paper  
   YES / NO

3. Direct officials to also undertake targeted consultation with the judiciary, representative leaders of the law profession, academics and other key stakeholders to discuss the CCRC  
   YES / NO

4. Direct officials to provide further substantive advice early in the New Year after consultation  
   YES / NO

5. Forward a copy of this briefing to the Minister of State Services and Attorney-General for their information  
   YES / NO

___________________________________________

Ruth Fairhall
Deputy Secretary, Policy

APPROVED      SEEN      NOT AGREED

___________________________________________

Hon Andrew Little
Minister of Justice

Date / /

Attachments: Appendix One – Previous reports on miscarriages of justice
Appendix One – Previous reports on miscarriages of justice

1. Several reports have recommended that New Zealand establish an independent body to investigate claims of miscarriages.

2. In 2003, a report titled *The Royal Prerogative of Mercy: A Review of New Zealand Practice* (the 2003 Report), recommended the creation of an independent board to investigate and refer appropriate cases to the Court of Appeal. The 2003 Report concluded the key benefits of such a body would be that:  
   2.1. applications would be assessed independently of the Executive, thus avoiding any constitutional or separation of powers issues  
   2.2. transparency would be brought to the process  
   2.3. the existence of (and publicity given to) an independent Board may encourage applications to be filed early, enabling cases where a miscarriage has occurred to be more speedily resolved, and  
   2.4. possible increased public confidence in the criminal justice system with respect to reducing the chances for miscarriages of justice to occur.

3. In terms of disadvantages, the 2003 Report noted that such a body would increase costs, may receive few complaints and would require legislation to establish it.

4. The conclusions of a 2005 Select Committee report, and a report by Sir Thomas Thorp were largely consistent with the findings of the 2003 Report.

5. In considering the information available at the time relating to New Zealand and international experiences with miscarriages of justice, Sir Thomas Thorp noted:
   5.1. The frequency of miscarriages of justice had likely been underestimated in New Zealand  
   5.2. “front end” reforms designed to reduce the occurrence of a miscarriages should take priority, but no system can totally prevent them occurring, and  
   5.3. identification of errors that do occur is not easy and requires significant expertise.

6. The report concluded that an independent body to address suspected miscarriages of justice would be more appropriate than an authority based in the Ministry of Justice. Further, no other arrangement would be more effective in gathering information on the frequency and causes of miscarriages of justice.

7. Sir Thomas Thorp also recommended that an independent body was an opportunity to address the “gross underutilisation” of the Royal prerogative process by Māori and Pasifika.

25 Sir Thomas Thorp is a former High Court Judge, Chairman of the Parole Board and Crown Solicitor.
27 Ibid, pg. 77.
28 Ibid, pg. 86.
29 Ibid.